Religious Diversity in Arab Society Myth, Conspiracy, and Reality

Mohammed Abu-Nimer

Managing diversity has emerged as one of the most valuable skills and competencies needed in the twenty-first century, especially with the massive technological advancement and changes that swept the globe since the end of the Cold War. New forms of communication, especially social media, have wiped out national boundaries and divides which in the past prevented people from comparing themselves with others outside of their own communities (national, ethnic, racial, religious, linguistic, cultural, etc.). In addition, there have been many rapid demographic changes due to migrants and refugees and due to mobility in general. Millions of people cross between the northern and southern hemispheres, as they attempt to start new life in search of a more secure living and better social and economic conditions.

These changes have resulted in significant transformation in the ethnic and religious composition of many societies and states. The Arab region is no exception. Its societies have experienced massive waves of protest move- ments and campaigns for political, social, and economic changes.1

Ethnic, tribal, and religious differences have been deployed by politicians and religious leaders alike to mobilize support and leverage to influence the national agenda and shape the public opinion in favor of their ideological preferences.

It is also well known and documented that ethnic and sectarian grievances were among the primary reasons that motivated and incited people to take to the streets, especially the youth who expressed resentment and anger over the existing failing political governance systems. These grievances exist despite the fact that celebrating religious harmony between Muslims and non- Muslims and among different Muslim sects is the primary discourse adopted and promoted by most Arab governments and regimes. Such discourse was essential and central for the Arab national movement that fought against

colonial powers in the 1950s and 1960s. It was also deployed by the lead- ers of various military coups (Iraq, Syria, Yemen, Libya, Sudan, etc.). The dominant narrative of national unity was based on the domination of cultural and religious majority which was utilized to mobilize support against colonial powers’ policies.2

This type of national unity suppressed any element, factor, voice, or agency that hinted to the need to recognize cultural and religious differences and or demanded a unique and special treatment of social groups due to their unique background. In fact, treason and foreign conspiracy were often the primary tools used by the gate keepers of Arab nationalists to prevent any serious consideration of the need for systematic inclusion of the various ethnicities, religions, sects, and marginalized cultural groups.3

The accumulated results of these policies of political, social, and economic marginalization, discrimination, and exclusion became clear in the demands of many groups prior to and during the Arab Spring revolts in Egypt, Leba- non, Yemen, Syria, Iraq, Bahrain, and so on. Many scholars and studies have linked the recent uprisings and political turmoil to the need for better arrange- ments to manage differences (age, gender, ethnicity, religion, culture, region, etc.) in every Arab society.

It should also be noted that there is a thread of discourse that has acknowl- edged cultural diversity and a basic level of coexistence and tolerance of cul- tural and religious practices in Arab societies and communities. This thread can be easily detected in the symbolic representation of cultural and religious diversity programs in many formal Arab governmental institutions. One will hear the statements “We have lived together for hundreds of years, and we eat and visit with each other. We do not differentiate between our people in our community”; and “We used to live together and celebrate our separate holidays and even exchange food and gifts in holidays.” Such typical state- ments made by elders and others capture the story and narrative of cultural and religious harmony that existed during precolonial and a couple of decades of postcolonial periods.4

CORE PRACTICES OF MANAGING DIVERSITY

Managing diversity effectively and in an inclusive framework requires social, political, and cultural transformation of the local and national spaces, in a way that respecting and accepting diversity is placed in the center and not in the margins of the national agenda. Ethnic, religious, gender, and cultural differences become a source of richness to be celebrated and not feared or disdained by members of the dominant majority. Society reconfigures its institutions (educational, cultural, political, economic, media, etc.) to

recognize the possible contributions that each of its national components can bring to the whole.

Globally, people and societies are still struggling to construct such systems to fully honor diversity and manage it in an ideal way, and some have made more progress in their efforts to respond to the needs of their diverse popula- tions.5 It is crucial to apply constructive diversity management in all spheres that affect the public and private lives of the citizens. Nevertheless, there are five essential core areas for the management of effective diversity:

1. Equal access to public spaces: members of the minority groups are able to relate to the public spaces and feel a sense of belonging and not exclusion. For example, the public square in the heart of the city not only has Quranic verses or Hadith, but it also has other religious groups’ representation; the Airport has prayer spaces for Muslims, Christians, and other religious groups; streets and boulevard names reflect religious diversity too. Diverse representation in the public space is the rule, not the exception.

2. Inclusive education: formal educational curriculum on all levels priori- tizes the principle of diversity. Such principles will be manifested in the teaching of history, religion, social sciences, math, chemistry, and so on. Mainstreaming diversity and inclusion in every subject allows young generations to become more inclusive in their approach, espe- cially to cultural and religious differences.6 For them, diversity becomes the rule and not the exception. Thus when celebrating national heroes, they are aware of the contribution of the diverse groups to the national project throughout their shared history. The challenges in implementing such principles, even after political peace agreements, can be observed in the case of Lebanon in which the formal public education system could agree on a unified curriculum of history or religion to be taught in the schools to students from all ethnic and religious affiliations. Since the Taef Agreement in 1991, the Lebanese Ministry of Education has struggled in implementing such a curriculum. Similar situation was in post-Saddam Iraq between 2003 and 2013, in which an inclusive civic education curriculum that reflects the principle of religious and ethnic diversity was debated and delayed.7

3. Common and equal access to citizenship: managing diversity con-

structively means that all the components of the society (of the nation state) have the right to equal representation in all the state’s structures and institutions. Limiting the access and representation means reduc- ing inclusion and perpetuating exclusion in the arena of civic rights. Thus, for example, the presidency or higher political offices are not exclusively limited to certain ethnic or religious groups; for example,

you do not have to be Muslim to become a president or prime minister, the minister of defense, the head of a national university, the director of official state media outlets, etc. For example, the Lebanese system con- tinues to be based on sectarian proportional arrangements in a majority of its formal institutions; other Arab political regimes have their own criteria for restrictions on free access to political, religious, military, or other sensitive government positions. The mere fact that you are a citizen qualifies you to run or occupy any office in the state. However, for such a principle to be implemented, there is a need to challenge the hegemonic domination of ethnic, cultural, or religious majoritarian or sectarian systems in Arab society.

1. Religious freedom: all faith groups (individually and collectively) have the right and equal access to practice their faith in public and private settings. Thus, there is no restriction on building mosques, churches, temples, synagogues, etc. In addition, governmental and formal state agencies recognize such religious diversity and allocate resources to celebrate and respect it. Such a principle has been extremely challeng- ing to implement in the Arab society context due to the domination of the Muslim discourse in both public and private spheres. This discourse is influenced by the Islamic religious heritage of Ahl Adhimma (Pro- tected People),8 which has in many ways dictated and shaped the for- mal and informal treatment of religious minorities in the Arab region, especially Christians and Jews. Although historically this principle provided Christians and Jews with relatively greater civic and religious rights than what the European protestant governance system provided to its minorities, there are major concerns in adopting such principles in our modern and global reality of today. In fact, raising such an issue has always been a sour diplomatic point between Northern Hemisphere policy makers and government officials in the Arab region. However, in the past decade, for a variety of reasons, there have been significant policy changes, especially in certain Gulf countries like UAE, Oman, and Bahrain in their position toward issues of religious freedom for Jewish and Christian minorities.9 However, it must be noted that the small number of Jews and Christians in these Arab societies and states constitute no significant threat to the dominant discourse and structures of the state and society at large. Thus, it is not clear to what extent these policies are internalized and sincerely adopted or whether they will con- tinue to be symbolic gestures to be utilized in the states’ public relations and public diplomacy image.

2. National calendar and narrative: constructing an inclusive formal state and national calendar for celebrations. Such a principle is crucial to reflect the sincere commitment of the state in enforcing the diversity in
   

its symbolic and substantial spheres and practices, especially when state media and formal agencies (education, economic institutions, military, etc.) adopt such inclusive practice. In the Arab society context, this will have implications for national and religious celebrations in the public spheres, for example, Christmas trees in the mayor’s offices, special programs on public TV recognizing and celebrating these religious events, special recognition by government officials of the diverse reli- gious discourse of other groups than Muslim Shia or Sunni dominant groups. Obviously, in this limited essay, one cannot comprehensively identify and list all the public and private spheres and on both individual and collective levels of practice. Nevertheless, it is obvious that socio- economic mobility and full integration in security and military forces are primary areas to ensure that diversity is indeed being institutionally respected. The religious and cultural identity of any individual or group should not be an obstacle to their advancement of acceptance in these institutions. For example, in the Arab society context, a Shai, Sunni, or any of the religious schools of thoughts (madhhab) should determine the opportunities for any individual advancement or acceptance in for- mal institutions.

OBSTACLES AND CHALLENGES TO DIVERSITY IN ARAB SOCIETY

The degree of success in implementing diversity measures in the above areas varies among different societies around the globe. Arab societies struggle with this issue as well. There are serious structural and cultural factors that impede the adaptation and implementation of such models of diversity. The processes of building institutions and practices that honor the principles of diversity and inclusion are being debated and manifested in the Arab region in many areas and in different ways, including academic debates, political movements, arts, social media campaigns, and religious voices. The dynam- ics of debating the limits of acceptance of diversity often reflects common sets of obstacles and challenges facing those who call for managing diversity in a more constructive and inclusive arrangement.10

When explaining the weak local and national capacities in managing diversity in the Arab society context, it is often attributed to a complex set of historical, economic, social, and political factors and forces. However, reli- gious identities, both intrareligious and interreligious, can play a significant role in the process of undermining or strengthening the fabric of diversity in the various Arab communities.

This section will examine how these factors have utilized the religious identity to perpetuate the exclusive domination of certain ethnic, cultural, and religious agencies in Arab societies.

Authoritarianism: in a postcolonial period of the history of Arab societ- ies, political and military leaders relied on authoritarian structures to form political, economic, and security institutions to consolidate their powers. Thus, ethnic and religious inclusivity was sacrificed in the name of building a unified nation as envisioned by the authoritarian regimes. Any opposition or questioning of such an approach was automatically labeled as treason and often punished by execution or long-term imprisonment.11

Tribal and ideological loyalty: in the process of stabilizing the newly formed Arab states (1950s), there was a pressing need for fostering political and military loyalty. Such loyalties were crucial for new regimes surrounded by internal and external threats and instability. Tribal and religious sectarian identities in Jordan, Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Libyan, Gulf states, and others lent themselves easily to non-inclusive management of diversity. Thus, key governing institutions were entrusted to individuals with unwavering loyalty to ruling parties and dominant political ideologies, or to those with clear reli- gious, sectarian, or tribal affiliation. For example, Baath party membership in both Iraq and Syria was used as a criterion for loyalty; tribal affiliation in Jordan was utilized by the Hashemite monarchy for governing the country, leading to the marginalization of Palestinian identity; similarly, Shia and Sunni identity in Gulf states and Arab and Berber cultures in North Africa become the criteria for awarding key positions within the government.

One of the direct consequences of these policies of exclusion was the lack

of development of strong political and parliamentarian norms and cultures. Thus, when many of these regimes and their centralized institutions collapsed in the Arab Spring (beginning of 2010), there were no strong, credible, and well-established political alternatives to gain the trust of the various forces who competed for control.12

The paradox of merit versus tribal loyalty has existed in the Arab cultural context for many centuries and has been debated by many scholars as many argued it is rooted in the cultural fabrics of norms and values of tribalism.13 In the context of religious diversity, it should be noted that constructive diversity management is undermined by the tribal, religious, or ethnic loy- alty in all its shapes and forms. In fact, many forms of exclusion of religious minorities and other forms of exclusion are affected by this principle which is often practiced in formal and informal fashion in official government and non-government institutions.14

Instrumentalization of education: the process of legitimizing exclusion and marginalization of diverse constituencies in Arab societies has existed for centuries. It has been transferred from one generation to another through

educational policies, structures, and institutions. Those have been utilized and instrumentalized by postcolonial regimes and leaders to perpetuate and maintain such exclusion of different ethnic, religious, and political groups. In fact, religious agencies have been agreed to be manipulated to justify such ideological practices. Thus Sunni and Shia clergies and institutions provided theological grounding for the exclusion of other religious minorities or other sects from their own dominant national majority public spaces.15

Such policies resulted in socializing younger generations with limited skills of critical thinking and lack of basic cultural competencies to deal with diverse reality. Thus, exclusion was normalized, and students, especially those who belong to the dominant majority or privileged groups, are de- sensitized to the pain and victimhood of marginalization from an early age. This mental frame was carried by their higher education, employment, and personal lives too.16

Structural violence: For the cultural practices of exclusion to be system- atic and systemic and to gain legitimacy for their existence, socialization agents utilized fear and direct or indirect violence. Thus, military and secu- rity forces were deployed in postcolonial Arab regimes to ensure stability and order under the banner of protecting national unity. In the process of enforcing these state rules, policies of structural violence were designed and implemented—for example, harsh security measures against political, ethnic, religious, or other forms of opposition; weakening or abolishing any formal agency that calls for legal, economic, and political accountability. Surviving these forms of structural violence became the primary concerns of those who were marginalized and called for inclusion.17 This tendency to suppress any political opposition through violent means also perpetuated the hegemonic domination of one ethnic, religious, or cultural group.18 It also prohibited the development of healthy and constructive localized forms of managing religious diversity in the society. On the contrary, the system of violence punished and persecuted voices of opposition who called for reforms in the arena of religious diversity and who were labeled enemies of the state.

The Conspiracy Syndrome: Accusing and blaming foreign forces for all

social and political ills in the social and political is central to the dynamics used by many religious and political leaders throughout human history. Dis- information is a key instrument used by leaders who want to silence internal dissent or discourage change in power relations. Undoubtedly, the external threat is often real and imposes tangible costs. The colonial legacy in the Arab region and the Israeli Zionist movement have played a huge and central role in being a real external threat that brought a great deal of destruction and victimhood in every Arab society.

However, such threat has been manipulated and utilized by political and religious agencies to justify the suppression of rights for many groups within

these societies. In the name of protecting the nation and withstanding against the external threats, economic, political, religious, and marginalization policies were created and implemented. Conspiracy theory has become an integral tool utilized by leaders to prevent and suppress demands for better management of diversity.

The above are only selected few core factors that obstructed inclusivity and constructive management of diversity, there are many others that can be identified and explored. However, the remaining of this chapter will focus on current constructive responses to enhance capacities for the management of diversity in Arab societies.

CAPACITIES FOR CONSTRUCTIVE DIVERSITY MANAGEMENT

The process of adopting diversity norms and practices is not only the responsibility of policy makers but also an individual responsibility and life journey. Every person can go through various development stages in becom- ing culturally, religiously, and nationally sensitive to diversity.19 However, this process requires certain capacities and skills that can be gained and practiced.

From denial to taking a stand: dealing with differences is at the core of managing diversity. Differences can be perceived as threatening, especially to those who have privileges to lose. For example, a male who enjoys the ben- efits of being a director of a legal firm in which women cannot be directors will be threatened by the calls for diversity and inclusion of women in such firm. Certain Buddhist monks who supported the dominance of Buddhism in Myanmar were threatened by the various religious and ethnic minorities call for inclusion. Similarly, white South Africans were threatened by calls for the inclusion of the black population and the end of apartheid. Similarly, the call to include Kurdish and other ethnic and religious minorities is faced by opposition by members of dominant religious and ethnic majorities in Arab societies.

Thus, recognizing the added value and importance of these cultural and

ethnic differences is the first step to moving away from the state of denial which is often reflected in the belief that there are no important differences among the various diverse groups in the Arab society. Insisting on the dis- course of unity and ignoring any form of diversity are obstacles in dealing with differences.

Once the person and group awareness recognized the existence of diverse ways of life and religious beliefs and practices, they developed different reac- tions to such diversity, as discussed below.

Superiority and defensiveness: Although the Muslim majority in the Arab societies are raised to believe in the notion of tolerance of other faiths, especially people of the book, they are also raised to believe that they are superior to them.20 The arguments of why their faith is superior and more perfect than other faith groups are required and integral part of religious and popular informal education. Such beliefs are often translated into prejudice attitudes and even to discriminatory practices. When dealing with religious differences and diversity, there is an initial resistance to accept the validity of the other faith groups and allow a space for them to be fully recognized and practiced.

Passive acceptance of difference: in the process of gaining and recognizing diversity, individuals learn to accept the fact that there are others who are dif- ferent from them and have the right to practice that difference. Those individ- uals can reach this realization or internalize this understanding from their own new and reformed understanding of their faith. For example, Muslims who have gone through this process often recite Qur’anic verse that encourages believers to respect the diversity of truth and religious practices.21 This type of attitude is a passive acceptance in which the person is obliged to accept the differences because of the religious and legal ramifications of rejecting them. Active acceptance of differences (pluralist): The profile of the active- accepting individuals is reflected in those who genuinely believed and internalized the principles that all humans have the right to culturally and religiously believe and practice their own identity in the way they choose without harming or damaging others. Obviously, there are many debates on the boundaries of these practices. The Geneva Haman Rights Declaration (1948) is one of those international agreements that attempts to regulate and define these boundaries. Nevertheless, the crux of this developmental stage of managing diversity constructively is that the individual accepts the fact that cultural and religious differences exist, need to be respected, and they are equal in their capacity to seek the truth. Thus, acceptance in this stage is not because of legal or religious laws only, but it stems from the belief that diversity is inherently good for human development, and it enriches individu- als and collective beings.

In the previous stages of diversity management, the individual believed that he/she has the absolute truth, and his/her group path is superior to others, and therefore the society, state, and national space should be constructed in a way to reflect such superiority. However, in this stage of active acceptance, the absolute truth to this individual is not exclusive to any group or faith. All faith groups have truths, pieces of the truth, or there is no single truth. On the cultural differences, the individual in this stage relates to differences without assigning any value of judgment or preference, but all are viewed from the functionality and power relations perspectives.22

REFORMING POLICIES OF DIVERSITY MANAGEMENT

Although the above four developmental stages of management of diversity characterize the individual’s journey of dealing with religious and cultural differences, state policies and societal norms and values can support or impede the process of gaining such competencies and skills. In current Arab societies, the political, religious, and social institutions have been struggling to manage diversity constructively, especially religious and ethnic diversity. The processes of reforming these institutions’ policies and regulations have been interrupted by many internal and external forces; nevertheless, there is an urgent need to continue, promote, and advance these various efforts.

One of the venues to enhance the capacity of the current Arab societies to manage diversity is through the support and development of inclusive citizen- ship for all ethnic and religious communities. In the last two decades, there have been a number of campaigns and efforts, especially led by civil society and faith-based organizations to advocate for such policy reforms in religious and governmental institutions. Some of these recommendations can directly enhance capacities to manage diversity:23

Religious institutions (1) develop an institutional strategy for promoting inclusive attitudes among followers, especially for religious, ethnic, cul- tural, and gender diversity;24 (2) reform existing formal religious narratives to support religious diversity, at least the passive acceptance of diversity directly and explicitly; (3) hold religious media accountable for their role in disseminating hate speech and incitement to violence against others; (4) establish programs and special units to institutionalize the efforts to engage with groups from the same and other faith and other faith groups; and (5) for- mulate and design explicit and direct strategy in support of equal citizenship for all diverse components in the Arab society.

Governmental institutions (1) design and formulate a national strategy to advance diversity management practices in all governmental institutions; (2) adopt regulations to prevent hate speech and incitement to violence and pro- tect religious freedom norms and practices; (3) revise national curriculum to ensure that every student is sensitized to and equipped with basic skills and competencies of diversity management; and (4) support national and local diversity councils to ensure that policies of inclusion are being implemented on such levels.

CONCLUSION

The collective and individual development of institutions that manage diver- sity constructively in the Arab region certainly requires the engagement of all

socialization agencies (religious, political, educational, cultural, media, legal, security, etc.). This is not a task that can be achieved by one of these agencies alone. In fact, a certain degree of coordination is necessary among and within these agencies in order for their efforts to be beneficial.

Within this construct for change, religious authority and institutions have an essential role to play due to the level of religiosity that exists within the fabric of the Arab society. For the development of diversity management systems based on the principle of acceptance and respect of differences, gaining the trust and credibility of religious agencies is central to unlock the hesitance and reduce resistance among various segments of the societies. Obviously working with such leaders does not exclude or negate the need to invest efforts with policy makers, media, and other sectors in the societies.

Finally, it is obvious that our emerging global economies and technologies have made it abundantly clear that all human societies and cultures have to learn to deal with differences and engage with the different other. In fact, for many groups, this has become an existential matter. The Arab societies are no exception to this rule. Reverting to primordial identities and retreating to nar- row enclaves of tribal, ethnic, and religious identity circles and spaces have proven to be destructive and traumatic for many groups in the Arab region in the past two decades. Thus, the way forward is to develop the internal capacities for strengthening and celebrating commonalities and managing differences constructively.

NOTES

1. See Fahed al-sumait; Nele Lenze and Michael c. Hudson (eds.). The Arab Uprisings Catalysts, Dynamics, and Trajectories (Rowman and Littlefield, 2014).

2. See Mohammed Abu-Nimer, Amal Khoury, and Emily Welty. Unity in Diver- sity: Interfaith Dialogue in the Middle East (USIP, 2007).

3. Ibid.

4. Many scholars explain the deterioration in religious pluralism and policies of exclusion by the rise of political Islam in late 1960s and early 1970s. (See: Youssef M. Choueiri, Islamic Fundamentalism (London: Printer Press, 1990); Peter Man- deville, Global Political Islam (London: Routledge, 2007; John L. Esposito, Islam and Politics (Contemporary Issues in the Middle East) (Syracuse: University Press, 1998); Syed Hussain Shaheed. “Political Islam: A Rising Force in the Middle East.” Pakistan Horizon 66, no. 4 (2013): 21–37. http://www.jstor.org/stable/24711513.

5. See: Synnøve Bendixsen, Mary Bente Bringslid and Halvard Vike, eds., Egali- tarianism in Scandinavia: Historical and Contemporary Perspectives (London: Palgrave, 2018). See also UNESCO reports and special issue on managing diversity https://unesdoc.unesco.org/in/documentViewer.xhtml?v=2.1.196&id=p::usmarcdef

_0000222319&file=/in/rest/annotationSVC/DownloadWatermarkedAttachment/attach_import_1c2dbd45-461c-461f-ad92-93eafa1c6cd1%3F_%3D222319eng.pdf &locale=en&multi=true&ark=/ark:/48223/pf0000222319/PDF/222319eng.pdf#%5B %7B%22num%22%3A4%2C%22gen%22%3A0%7D%2C%7B%22name%22%3A%22XYZ%22%7D%2Cnull%2Cnull%2C0%5D (accessed November 19, 2022).

1. See UNESCO special reports on efforts for inclusion of religion, gender, and cultural diversity in education: making content of textbook inclusive: A focus on religion, gender and culture. (2013). https://unesdoc.unesco.org/ark:/48223/ pf0000247337.locale=fr (accessed November 19, 2022).

2. The author was involved for five years in a project to introduce civic educa- tion manual for Iraqi and Kurdish teachers through Salam Institute and USIP (United States Institute for Peace). The initiative also involved several exposure trips to the Lebanese Ministry of Education to learn about their post war experience in dealing with civic education for diversity and inclusion. In the Iraqi case, the ministry of edu- cation of the federal government and the KRG) (Kurdistan Region) agreed for the first time in their history to sponsor a common manual to train teachers in how to introduce issues of religious and ethnic diversity. The manual was printed by the Iraqi Ministry of Education and KRG Ministry of Education. (USIP project on Iraq Civic Education 2008–2013-unpublished report).

3. There are thousands of academic and theological resources debating the mean- ing and implementation of the Ahl Adhimma principle in Muslim society and history. The following is a one of the classic sources defining the status of Ahl ADhimma.

“According to Islamic law, the non-Muslims inhabited in the Islamic state were called ahlu dh-dhimmati (people of protection) or simply al-dhimma or dhim- mis. They included the Christian, Jewish, Magian, Samaritan and Sabian. Ahl al-dhimma were prohibited in the Muslim state from holding public religious cer- emonies, from raising their voices loudly when praying and even from ringing their church bells aloud. All schools agree that it is not allowed to build new churches, synagogues, convent, hermitage or cell in towns or cities of Dar al-Islam (Muslim lands). When these injunctions were disobeyed, the Muslim leaders were authorized to treat the offenders as dwellers in Dar al-Harb (non-Muslim lands) and not as ahl al-dhimma in Dar al-Islam (Muslim lands), vide Subh al-A’asha fi Sina’at at al- Insha (Cairo, 1922, 13: 356) by Qalaqashandi (d. 821/1418).

Also see: Ahl al-Ḏh̲imma”, in: Encyclopaedia of Islam, Second Edition, edited by P. Bearman, Th. Bianquis, C.E. Bosworth, E. van Donzel, W.P. Heinrichs. Consulted online on 31 December 2022. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/1573-3912_islam

_DUM_0168 (2012).

1. Synagogues and churches were open ion such countries and symbolic gestures of inclusion were introduced in UAE and Bahrain, too.

See: Are the Arab Gulf States Improving Religious Liberty? By Steven How- ard on October 7, 2019. https://providencemag.com/2019/10/arab-persian-gulf-states

-religious-liberty/ (accessed in December 21, 2022).

1. See several cases and examples of managing religious diversity in the Arab region in: Mohammed Abu-Nimer and Ramy Atta (eds.). Managing Religious Diver- sity in Arab Society (KAICIID Publication, 2022). (Arabic).

2. See Abu-Nimer, et al, 2007.

3. Obviously, there are many other factors that contributed to the lack of political and parliamentarian c=norms and cultures the Arab societies such media, education, military and security, etc.

4. See recent report on:

5. See Political Corruption in the Arab World (Aman Transparency-Palestine. June 2014).

This report was prepared in partnership with: The Lebanese Transparency Association Transparency Morocco I Watch Organization- Tunisia Yemeni Team for Transparency and Integrity The Coalition for Integrity and Accountability- AMAN- Palestine Egyptians without Borders (EWB) Work Team: Main researcher: Dr. Ahmad Abu-DayyiaPalestine Ms. Hoda Ghosn- Lebanon Ms. Aya Jarad- Tunisia Dr. Ahmad Moufid- Morocco Dr. Abd-Albaqi Shamsan Qayed- Yemen Dr. Yosri ‘Azbawi- Egypt

https://www.aman-palestine.org/cached_uploads/download/migrated-files/ itemfiles/00641c6049323493a8bf87fa4df1054c.pdf (accessed November 22, 2022).

See also: Mohammed Abu-Nimer. Nonviolence and Peacebuilding in Islamic Context (University Press of Florida, 2003).

1. In Iraq Saddam Hussein regime utilized Sunni religious establishment to jus- tify his suppression of Shia clergy who were not politically loyal. In Syria the Asad Regime utilized Alwaits clergy to justify his states exclusion of Sunni.

See:  https://carnegieendowment.org/2016/01/07/shia-centric-state-building

-and-sunni-rejection-in-post-2003-iraq-pub-62408 (accessed Dec. 2, 2022).

1. see Mohammad Shafique and Mohammed Abu-Nimer. Interfaith Dialogue: A guide for Muslims International Institute for Islamic Thought (IIIT), 2011.

Also, the author has led hundreds of dialogue and capacity building train- ing with Arab religious leaders and youth from religious institutions. Based on this experience in Muslim intrafaith relations, there is a great deal of ignorance and misperception being injected in the religious education institutions in the Arab region regarding Sunni Shia relations. Participants always admit their lack of knowledge and any significant experience or exposure to the other side’s discourse and narrative.

1. Many communists, Muslim brotherhood, and other opposition activists lost their lives in the prisons and were prosecuted by the regimes and their security forces.

2. وجيه كوثراني ؛  هويات فائضة مواطنة منقوصة: فى تهافت خطاب حوار الحضارات وصدامها عربية؛ دار الطليعة للطباعة والنشر ؛ بيروت ؛ 2004

also See

ياكوب جوزيف, مابعد الأقليات بديل عن تكاثر الدول, ترجمة حسين عمر, المركز الثقافي العربي، بيروت، الدار البيضاء، ط1، 2004.

1. See Abu-Nimer “Conflict Resolution, Culture, and Religion: Toward a Train- ing Model of Interreligious Peacebuilding.” Journal of Peace Research, 38, no. 6 (Nov. 2001): 685–704.

2. This sense of superiority is often linked to the religious interpretations support- ing beliefs such as: Islam is the perfect religion; no other religions or prophets after Islam; Christians and Jews have strayed away from the righteous path, etc. Such set of beliefs and their supporting interpretations have prompted exclusion and fed a sense of justified policies of superiority among certain Muslims.

3. To You Your Religion and To Me Mine (Qur’an 109:1–6).

1. For more on this developmental stage, see Bennet 1993. And Abu-Nimer adap-tation of this model in (2006).

2. The selective list of recommendations are adapted from various consultations (2019—2021) carried out by a consortium of Arab (Muslim and Christian) faith- based organizations convened for two years to create a common and inclusive citizen- ship charter. Another set of recommendations was developed by the Arab platform for interreligious dialogue created by KAICIID in 2014 and continued to operate in the region (see: www.kaiciid.org).

3. Abu-Nimer, Mohammed. 2017 “Engaging Interreligious Peacebuilding Agen- cies and Policymakers in Responding to Conflicts,” in Observatoire Géopoli- tique du Religieux. Institut de Relations Internationales et Strategiques. February 2017. http://www.iris-france.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/02/Obs-religion-f%C3%A9vrier-2017.pdf; Abu-Nimer, Mohammed. 2017. “Injecting Morality in Conflict: The Role of Religious and Interreligious Actors in Peacebuilding and Policy Mak- ing,” in the Berkley Forum. Georgetown University’s Berkley Center for Religion, Peace, and World Affairs. 22 February 2017. https://berkleycenter.georgetown.edu/ forum/the-vatican-and-peacebuilding-exploring-the-church-s-role-in-conflict-resoluion/responses/injecting-morality-in-conflict-the-role-of-religious-and-interreligious -actors-in-peacebuilding-and-policymaking; Abu-Nimer, Mohammed. “Interreligious Peacebuilding: An Emerging Field of Research and Practice,” in Sustainable Secu- rity, Sustainablesecurity.org, 16 March 2016. https://www.oxfordresearchgroup.org.uk/blog/interreligious-peacebuilding-an-emerging-field-of-research-and-practice.

REFERENCES

• Abu-Nimer, “Conflict Resolution, Culture, and Religion: Toward a Training Model of Interreligious Peacebuilding.” Journal of Peace Research, 38. 6 (Nov. 2001): 685–704.

• Abu-Nimer, Mohammed and Ramy Atta (eds.), Managing Religious Diversity in Arab Society [in Arabic] (KAICIID Publication, 2022).

• Abu-Nimer, Mohammed, Amal Khoury, and Emily Welty, Unity in Diversity: Inter- faith Dialogue in the Middle East (USIP, 2007).

• Abu-Nimer, Mohammed. “Interreligious Peacebuilding: An Emerging Field of Research and Practice,” in Sustainable Security, Sustainablesecurity.org, 16 March 2016. https://www.oxfordresearchgroup.org.uk/blog/interreligious-peacebuilding -an-emerging-field-of-research-and-practice

• Abu-Nimer, Mohammed. 2017 “Engaging Interreligious Peacebuilding Agencies and Policymakers in Responding to Conflicts,” in Observatoire Géopolitique du Reli- gieux. Institut de Relations Internationales et Strategiques. February 2017. http:// www.iris-france.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/02/Obs-religion-f%C3%A9vrier -2017.pdf

• Abu-Nimer, Mohammed. 2017. “Injecting Morality in Conflict: The Role of Reli- gious and Interreligious Actors in Peacebuilding and Policy Making,” in the 

• Berkley Forum. Georgetown University’s Berkley Center for Religion, Peace, and World Affairs. 22 February 2017. 

https://berkleycenter.georgetown.edu/forum/the-vatican-and-peacebuilding-exploring-the-church-s-role-in-conflict-resolution/responses/injecting-morality-in-conflict-the-role-of-religious-and-interreligious-actors-in-peacebuilding-and-policymaking;

• Al-sumait, Fahed, Nele Lenze, and Michael c. Hudson, eds., The Arab uprisings cata- lysts, dynamics, and trajectories (Rowman and Littlefield, 2014).

• Bendixsen, Synnøve, Mary Bente Bringslid and Halvard Vike, eds., Egalitarianism in Scandinavia: Historical and Contemporary Perspectives (London: Palgrave, 2018).

• Choueiri, Youssef M. Islamic Fundamentalism (London: Printer Press, 1990). Esposito, John L., Islam and Politics (Contemporary Issues in the Middle East) (Syra-cuse: University Press, 1998).

• Mandeville, Peter, Global Political Islam (London: Routledge, 2007).

• Mohammed Abu-Nimer. Nonviolence and Peacebuilding in Islamic Context (Univer- sity Press of  Florida, 2003).

• Political Corruption in the Arab World (Aman Transparency-Palestine. June 2014). Qalaqashandi (d. 1418), Subh al-A’asha fi Sina’at at al-Insha (Cairo, 1922).

• Shafique, Mohammad and Mohammed Abu-Nimer. Interfaith Dialogue: A guide for Muslims (International Institute for Islamic Thought (IIIT), 2011).

• Shaheed, Syed Hussain, “Political Islam: A Rising Force in the Middle East.” Paki- stan Horizon 66, no. 4 (2013): 21–37. http://www.jstor.org/stable/24711513.

• Wajih kawtharani, hawiyat fa’ida wa muwatana naqisa [Excessive Identities and Incomplete Citizenry] (Beirut, Lebanon: Dar al-Tali’a, 2004).

• Yaqub, Joseph, Ma Ba’da al-Aqaliyat [After Minorities] (Beirut, Lebanon: Center of Arab Culture, 2004)

• Political Corruption in the Arab World (Aman Transparency-Palestine. June 2014). Qalaqashandi (d. 1418), Subh al-A’asha fi Sina’at at al-Insha (Cairo, 1922).

• Shafique, Mohammad and Mohammed Abu-Nimer. Interfaith Dialogue: A guide for Muslims (International Institute for Islamic Thought (IIIT), 2011).

• Shaheed, Syed Hussain, “Political Islam: A Rising Force in the Middle East.” Paki- stan Horizon 66, no. 4 (2013): 21–37. http://www.jstor.org/stable/24711513.

• Wajih kawtharani, hawiyat fa’ida wa muwatana naqisa [Excessive Identities and Incomplete Citizenry] (Beirut, Lebanon: Dar al-Tali’a, 2004).

• Yaqub, Joseph, Ma Ba’da al-Aqaliyat [After Minorities] (Beirut, Lebanon: Center of Arab Culture, 2004)

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